NO HOMEOWNER’S COVERAGE FOR ACCIDENT OCCURRING ON LAND HELD FOR DEVELOPMENT. Metropolitan Property & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Jablonske. Minnesota Court of Appeals. Published. Filed October 3, 2006. A snowmobiler was injured when he struck an unmarked snow-covered ditch with his snowmobile on land owned by a developer. The injured party sued the developer and the developer made a claim on his homeowner’s insurance policy. The insurer brought a declaratory judgment action and moved for summary judgment. The district court determined that there was no coverage under the homeowner’s policy and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The policy covered “legal liability resulting from an occurrence in which there is actual accidental property damage, personal injury or death, anywhere in the world, subject to the limitations and exclusions” in the policy. The policy had an exclusion for “liability or claims connected with any business, profession or occupation.” The injured party (who stepped into the shoes of the insured through a Miller-Shugart settlement) argued that the business exclusion did not apply because that exclusion applied only to the insured’s business profession or occupation and that this land held for development was not used in the insured’s business, profession or occupation. The injured party was seeking a distinction between a business pursuits exclusion and a business exclusion and argued that this policy was merely a business exclusion. The injured party cited case law from Michigan that supported its position. The Court of Appeals declined to follow the Michigan case law and so declined to recognize a distinction between a business exclusion and a business pursuits exclusion. The injured party then argued that there was no business occurring on this land at the time of the accident. The insured, a developer, had purchased this land with the intent of developing it at a later date. The insured had leased the property to a farmer. The insured was in the planning stages of developing the property, including hiring an architect and had the property rezoned for residential purposes. Prior to the accident, the municipality had constructed sewer and water lines through the property. A developer of an adjacent property had also installed a storm sewer, which resulted in the ditch in which the snowmobiler was injured. Based upon these factors, the Court of Appeals held that the property was being used as a part of the insured’s business at the time of the accident, even though no actual construction of the development had commenced. The policy also contained a business premises exclusion. The insured had testified that while he had rented the property to a farmer in the summer prior to the accident, he did not intend on renting it to a farmer in the subsequent summer. The injured party argued that that fact took the property out of the business premises exclusion in the policy. The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that the insured’s intention to not lease the property to the farmer in the subsequent season did not “overnight” transform the use of the property from farming to vacant. Therefore the business premises exclusion still applied. In addition, all of the predevelopment activities that the insured had undertaken to develop the property were probably sufficient to keep it in the business premises exclusion.
ABSOLUTE POLLUTION EXCLUSION BARS COVERAGE FOR PERSONAL INJURY CAUSED BY EQUIPMENT EXHAUST. Continental Casualty Co. v. Advanced Terrazzo & Tile Co., Inc. United States Court of Appeal, Eighth Circuit. Filed August 30, 2006. The insured was performing interior construction work, using propane powered equipment. The injured party, a employee of another contractor working on the project, claimed that the carbon monoxide released from the equipment caused him to fall at the construction site. The insurer brought a declaratory judgment action in federal district court. The insured subcontractor had a commercial general liability policy that provided coverage for claims based upon bodily injury or property damage. The policy contained an exclusion for bodily injury or property damage caused by pollution. Pollution was broadly defined by the policy and was classified by the Court of Appeals as an “absolute pollution exclusion”. The district court granted summary judgment to the insurer and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The insured argued that the absolute pollution exclusion was ambiguous when applied to routine business hazards such as release of carbon monoxide from its equipment. The Court of Appeals disagreed, and cited several Minnesota Court of Appeals cases that held that similar absolute pollution exclusion clauses were unambiguous and that they applied to pollutants that occurred in the normal course of business activities, including indoor pollution.
ALLOCATION OF LEGAL LIABILITY AND DEFENSE COSTS AMONG MULTIPLE INSURERS. Wooddale Builders, Inc. v. Maryland Casualty Co. Minnesota Supreme Court. Filed October 5, 2006. Wooddale Builders is a general contractor that constructs single family homes. In 2000, it began receiving claims for defective construction from owners of stucco homes that it had built from 1991 to 1999. Eventually a total of 60 different homeowners brought claims against Wooddale. The homeowners alleged that the construction defects were causing water intrusion and mold growth. Wooddale Builders had commercial general liability policies with five different companies during the relevant time period. The policies did not overlap. Wooddale Builders commenced a declaratory judgment action against one of its insurers, which then commenced a third party action against the four other insurers. The parties agreed that the alleged damage to the homes was caused by repeated water intrusion occurring over an extended period of time with continual, progressive and indivisible damage occurring to the homes. The parties also agreed that allocation of liability should be by the pro rata by the time on the risk method. At some point, after most but not all of the homeowners claims had been made against Wooddale Builders, Wooddale Builders ceased to have water intrusion coverage. The trial court granted summary judgment, and concluded that the appropriate method of allocating damages to the five insurers was the pro rata by time on the risk method. The district court concluded that the start date for allocation purposes was the closing date on the purchase of each home and the end date was the date that Wooddale was put on notice of that homeowner’s claim. The district court also concluded that the investigation and defense costs should be borne equally by the insurers whose policies were triggered for each claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision to grant summary judgment but reversed the district court’s ruling on the end date for allocation purposes and the apportionment of defense costs. The Court of Appeals concluded that the appropriate ending date for allocating among consecutive insurers is the date of remediation. The Court of Appeals also reversed the trial court on allocation of the investigation and defense costs, holding that such costs should be allocated to the insurers according to the same method used to apportion the indemnity cost. The Supreme Court reversed.
The Supreme Court first analyzed which insurers were on the risk for each particular homeowner’s claim. Each of the policies was an occurrence based CGL policy that provided coverage for damage occurring during the policy regardless of when the occurrence that causes the damage happens and regardless of when a claim is made. The parties in this case agreed that property damage began at the closing date of the sale of each home, and continued uninterrupted until remediation was completed. The Supreme Court recognized that each policy excluded coverage for damages that were expected by the insured before the policy period began. Therefore, the insurers were not responsible for any claim in which the homeowner provided notice of that claim prior to the commencement of that particular policy period. Therefore, the Supreme Court held that only insurers that provided coverage to Wooddale between the closing date of a particular home and Wooddale’s receipt of notice of claim with respect to that property are on the risk for that claim.
The Supreme Court next addressed whether the insurers were on the risk for all or only part of each triggered policy. The Court held that each insurer that is on the risk with respect to a particular claim is on the risk for the entirety of the policy period, regardless of when Wooddale closed on the sale of the property or when Wooddale received notice of the homeowner’s claim.
The next issue was the total period over which liability is allocated. At some point Wooddale Builders became uninsured in regards to water intrusion liability. This happened after the policy periods for each of the defendant insurers. The Court remanded to the trial court to determine whether Wooddale was uninsured voluntarily or whether Wooddale was unable to purchase any water intrusion insurance for that time period. The Court then held that if the trial court determines that Wooddale was unable to purchase any water intrusion insurance, then the total period over which liability is allocated for each of the 60 claims ends with the end of the policy year in which Wooddale received notice of the claim or with the end of the last period of insurance coverage, whichever is earlier. But if Wooddale was voluntarily self insured during any time period when damages occurred, then the total period over which liability is allocated for each claim must include the time period that Wooddale was self insured and that time period will end with the end of the policy year in which Wooddale received notice of the claim or with the date of notice of claim, whichever is later. The court also analyzed the total damages to be allocated among the parties. The court noted that while the time period over which damages are allocated ends with the policy period in which Wooddale received notice of the homeowner’s claim, the parties agreed that the damages continued to occur until the construction defects were remediated. The court held that the total damages to be allocated with respect to each affected home are the total damages that Wooddale is legally obligated to pay with respect to that home, regardless of whether the damages occurred during the total period over which liability is allocated. Therefore, the damages occurring after notice of claim is provided but before remediation, can be properly allocated to the insurers.
The Court of Appeals held that the investigation and defense costs should be allocated in a manner similar to the liability damages. The Supreme Court reversed, and held that in regard to each claim, the investigation and defense costs should be allocated equally to each insurer that was on the risk for that claim. The policy behind that rule is to encourage each insurer on the risk to defend the insured as soon as possible.
COURT MUST EXPRESSLY DECIDE ALL CLAIMS FOR RELIEF. VoiceStream Minneapolis, Inc. v. RPC Properties, Inc. Minnesota Supreme Court. Filed January 10, 2008. The parties entered into a settlement agreement but VoiceStream refused to comply with the terms. RPC brought a motion to enforce the settlement agreement, requesting its costs and attorney fees in bringing the motion and a claim for damages it incurred as a result of the failure to comply with the settlement agreement. The court did order VoiceStream to comply with the settlement agreement and awarded RPC its costs and attorney fees but did not address the issue of RPC’s claim for damages as a result of non-compliance with the settlement agreement. RPC appealed and the Court of Appeals ruled that the district court’s failure to specifically rule on the request for damages was equivalent to a denial of the request. The Supreme Court reversed. The court held that district courts should treat a motion to enforce the settlement agreement as it would a motion for summary judgment and explicitly grant or deny each claim for relief. Whether this decision applies to motions other than motions to enforce settlements is uncertain. In setting out its holding the court did recognize that there is an important public policy in encouraging and enforcing settlements of claims.
SECOND ACT OF NEGLIGENCE STARTS A SECOND LIMITATIONS PERIOD. Devereaux v. Stroup. Minnesota Court of Appeals. Unpublished. Filed January 8, 2008. This is a legal malpractice action. The attorney had purportedly provided his clients with bad advice on gifting and tax issues in 1997. That advice resulted in criminal and civil actions in 2002, in which the attorney also, allegedly, was negligent. The attorney argued that the damages the clients incurred as a result of the 1997 advice was the same negligent act as the damages incurred by the resulting litigation in 2002. The district court granted summary judgment to the attorney. The Court of Appeals reversed regarding any damages incurred as a result of the 2002 advice and affirmed regarding to damage incurred by the 1997 advice. The court found that the 1997 advice and the 2002 advice were distinct acts. The 1997 advice led to civil and criminal exposures for conversion and theft. The 2002 advice may have left the clients in a less defensible litigation position regarding the litigation arising from the conversion and theft.
HOMEOWNER’S ACTION AGAINST HIS BUILDER’S INSURANCE COMPANY ALLOWED TO PROCEED. Aten v. Scottsdale Ins. Co. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals. Filed January 8, 2008. The homeowner contracted with a building contractor to construct his home. After closing on the purchase of the home, numerous defects were discovered. The homeowner sued the contractor and received a default judgment. The homeowner then commenced a direct action against the builder’s commercial general liability carrier. The carrier removed the case to federal court and the federal district court dismissed the claim. The 8th Circuit reversed. The 8th Circuit found that there would be coverage under the policy if the defective work that led to the judgment was work performed by the insured’s subcontractors. Since the underlying action proceeded via default and no discovery was conducted, the 8th Circuit reversed and remanded back to the district court to allow the homeowner to conduct limited discovery to determine which of the defective work items were performed by subcontractors. The court did not address the issue of the homeowner pursuing a direct action against the contractor’s insurance.
DISTRICT COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE COVERAGE ISSUE IN A CASE SUBJECT TO NO-FAULT ARBITRATION. Auto Owners Ins. Co. v. Star Windshield Repair, Inc. Minnesota Court of Appeals. Published. Filed January 8, 2008. Star Windshield replaced the windshields of its customers in exchange for an assignment of the customer’s insurance proceeds. All of the customers in this case were insured by Auto Owners. Star Windshield then sent a bill for services to Auto Owners who sent Star Windshield a payment for less than the amount billed. Star Windshield then attempted to initiate arbitration under the No-Fault Act to recover the difference. Auto Owners filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that the non-assignment clause in the insurance policy prevented the assignment to Star Windshield. The district court issued a temporary restraining order and eventually granted Auto Owners’ motion for summary judgment, holding that the non-assignment clause in the policy prevented the assignment. Star Windshield appealed. The first issue the Court of Appeals addressed was whether the district court had jurisdiction to decide the coverage issue in this case subject to the No-Fault Act. The Court of Appeals held that it was proper for the district court to rule on the coverage issue before deciding whether to compel arbitration.
The Court of Appeals then looked at whether the assignment of the policy proceeds for windshield repair to Star Windshield were enforceable. Star Windshield did not dispute that the non-assignment clause in the policy was enforceable, but argued that it did not apply to the assignment of proceeds for a property loss claim under the policy. The Court of Appeals did a detailed review of Minnesota case law on this issue and determined that the non-assignment clause was broad in scope because it attempted to prohibit an assignment of any interest in the policy. Further, in this case the amount of the property loss was in dispute and that was further reason to disallow the assignment to Star Windshield.
DROP DOWN LIMIT IN AUTO INSURANCE POLICY IS ENFORCEABLE. Frey v. United Services Automobile Ass’n. Minnesota Court of Appeals. Published. Filed January 8, 2008. Aven Frey was injured in an automobile accident in which her younger brother was driving. The vehicle was owned by Aven’s father and the driver was clearly a covered person under the policy. Aven and her family brought a declaratory judgment action against the insurer seeking a determination that the full $500,000 per accident limit on the policy governed coverage for the injuries suffered by Aven. The insurer argued that the drop down limit for injuries to a member of the covered person’s (driver) family residing within the covered person’s household applied and the drop down limit was $60,000.
The court first looked at whether the drop down limit for bodily injury coverage for resident family members is valid and enforceable. The Court of Appeals found that it was enforceable since even at the drop down limit it provided the mandatory coverage of $30,000 for each person and $60,000 for each accident. The Court of Appeals also found that the drop down limit did not contravene any applicable statutes. The Court of Appeals next analyzed whether the provision was ambiguous. The court found that provision was not ambiguous. The court next looked at whether the reasonable expectations doctrine applied and prevented application of the drop down limit in this case. The court recognized that most policyholders would be surprised to learn about a drop down exclusion. However, it found that the drop down limit was set out clearly in the policy’s exclusions section and it was not ambiguous. The reasonable expectations doctrine does not destroy the insured’s obligation to read the policy. Therefore, the Court of Appeals held that the drop down provision did not violate the reasonable expectations of the insured in this case.
The Court of Appeals then looked at whether Aven was a family member residing with the driver. At the time of the accident, Aven was a college student who stayed at the family home during most school breaks and holidays. The Court of Appeals, after looking at a number of facts, determined that Aven was not residing with the driver at the time of the accident. The Court of Appeals focused on the fact that while at college, Aven lived with her fiancé and that she had set up a separate household with her fiancé. The Court of Appeals also noted that following college, Aven was not planning on returning to live with her family, but rather was going to get married and start a new household with her fiancé. Therefore, the Court of Appeals held that Aven was not a family member residing with the driver and the drop down limits did not apply in this case.
BUSINESS EVALUATOR SELECTED BY STIPULATED COURT ORDER IS NOT ENTITLED TO QUASI-JUDICIAL IMMUNITY. Peterka v. Dennis. Minnesota Court of Appeals. Published opinion. Filed January 29, 2008. In a marital dissolution action the parties agreed to retain Dennis to value the parties’ business. Dennis conditioned his employment on the parties obtaining a court order appointing him as a neutral. The parties signed a stipulation that the court signed as an order. Following the dissolution action, Peterka brought an action against Dennis for malpractice, producing an expert report stating that the valuation breached the applicable standard of care. Dennis and his employer, who was also sued by Peterka, moved for summary judgment arguing that as a court-appointed neutral, Dennis was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity and the employer was entitled to vicarious quasi-judicial immunity. The district court agreed and granted summary judgment. The Court of Appeals reversed. Minnesota law provides that quasi-judicial immunity should be extended to all whom, via the law or the agreement of the parties, commits the exercise of authority of an essentially judicial nature. In this case the Court of Appeals made a distinction between an expert appointed to provide an expert opinion, such as Dennis, and somebody retained to resolve a dispute between the parties. In this case, while the parties had agreed to allow Dennis to provide the valuation number for the business, there was nothing in the stipulated order that would have prevented the parties from disputing the number provided by Dennis. The Court of Appeals noted that the stipulated order did not prevent either party from presenting other evidence as to the valuation of the business.
COURT OF APPEALS REFUSES TO ADOPT THE “DISCOVERY RULE” FOR COMMENCING A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS PERIOD. Hempel v. Creek House Trust. Minnesota Court of Appeals. Published. Filed December 31, 2007. Plaintiff brought an action for breach of a right of first refusal agreement. The district court dismissed that portion of the action as barred by the six-year statute of limitations and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The breach consisted of the other party failing to provide him notice of a conveyance of the property. Plaintiff argued that the statute of limitations for him to bring his breach of the agreement did not begin to accrue until he discovered that the agreement had been breached. The Court of Appeals disagreed holding that the statute of limitations period commences when the plaintiff could have brought an action that would survive a Rule 12 motion. The court found that plaintiff could have brought his action in 1992 when the failure to provide notice of sale under the right of first refusal agreement occurred. Defendant argued that he could not have brought the lawsuit at that time because he did not discover what had happened until years later. The Court of Appeals disagreed and affirmed summary judgment.
HOMEOWNER HAS A DUTY TO PROTECT A CHILD INVITEE FROM SEXUAL ABUSE BY ANOTHER ADULT RESIDENT IN THE HOME. Bjerke v. Johnson. Minnesota Supreme Court. Published. Filed December 27, 2007. The plaintiff, while a minor, lived with the defendant and her male friend on and off for four years. During that time the plaintiff and the male friend had a sexual relationship. Plaintiff sued defendant claiming that the defendant failed to protect her from the sexual abuse. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendant finding that there was no special relationship between the parties. The Court of Appeals reversed and the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was a special relationship between the parties. The special relationship arose because the defendant voluntarily took custody of the plaintiff under circumstances in which the plaintiff was deprived of her normal opportunities for self protection. The court found that even though the plaintiff had the ability to tell somebody about the abuse by making a phone call or by telling her family when she went to visit them, she was deprived of her normal opportunity to self protection because she was not residing with her parents as would normally be the case. The court concluded that had she been residing with her parents they may have noticed that there was something wrong with her and been able stop the abuse. The court noted that there was evidence that the defendant had provided the plaintiff with room and board and had adopted rules for the plaintiff’s conduct while in her home.
The defendant argued that the plaintiff assumed the risk of the sexual abuse because it was a consensual sexual relationship and the plaintiff admitted that she took affirmative steps to conceal the sexual relationship. The court disagreed, noting that under criminal statutes the consent of a minor to sexual relations with an adult has been rejected as a criminal defense. Also, under the assumption of risk defense it is critical that the plaintiff have the ability to appreciate the danger arising from the behavior and that due to the age of the plaintiff she was unable to do that in this case.
DEPOSITIONS IN CIVIL MATTER STATE ENDING RESOLUTION OF CRIMINAL MATTER. In re Marriage of Deal. Minnesota Supreme Court. Published. Filed November 1, 2007. Ryan Deal was charged with sexual abuse of his step-daughter. Following the abuse charges, his wife filed for divorce. As part of the divorce action Deal attempted to take the depositions of the child he was alleged to have abused as well as another step-child. The purpose of those depositions was for discovery and his pursuit of full custody of the child with his wife. There was no dispute that the alleged sexual abuse was one of the issues that was going to be addressed by the depositions. The state attempted to intervene in the dissolution action to stay those depositions, arguing that the depositions would not be allowed in the criminal proceeding and Deal was using the marital dissolution proceeding to obtain information that was not discoverable in the criminal proceeding. The district court refused to allow the state to intervene and refused to quash the depositions of the step-children. The state petitioned the Court of Appeals for writ of prohibition to prevent the district court from allowing the depositions and the Court of Appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court reversed. The court found that there is a strong public policy against allowing a criminal defendant to circumvent the limited scope of discovery in the criminal rules. Due to that policy and the fact that in a civil proceeding there is often no party to assert the public’s interest in preventing the circumvention of the criminal discovery rules, the court concluded that the state should have been allowed to permissively intervene in the marital dissolution proceeding for the limited purpose of requesting a protective order staying the depositions of the step-children. The court also determined that the district court erred by not granting a protective order preventing the depositions in the dissolution action. The court also set forth a facts and circumstances test for determining when civil discovery should be stayed in order to prevent abuse of the limited criminal discovery rules. The court held that stay of the depositions was appropriate in this case and so it granted a writ of prohibition staying the depositions in the dissolution action until the criminal matter was resolved.
MORTGAGE HOLDER CAN BE ADDED TO MECHANIC’S LIEN FORECLOSURE ACTION AFTER THE DEADLINE FOR JOINING OTHER LIEN HOLDERS HAS EXPIRED. Mavco, Inc. v. Eggink. Minnesota Supreme Court. Filed August 23, 2007. Contractor commences a mechanic’s lien foreclosure action, naming as defendants to the action the owner of the property and the mortgage holder as of a few days prior to filing the complaint. Three days before the complaint was filed the owner granted a new mortgage to Wells Fargo and paid off the other two mortgages that had been of record. Wells Fargo waited two months to record that mortgage. Shortly after filing the mechanic’s lien foreclosure action, the contractor recorded a notice of lis pendens. The notice of lis pendens was recorded after the Wells Fargo mortgage had been executed but before the Wells Fargo mortgage had been recorded. The contractor later learned of the Wells Fargo mortgage and attempted to join Wells Fargo as a party but that request was denied by the district court which cited the mechanic’s lien statute for the rule that all parties to a mechanic’s lien foreclosure action must be joined within one year of the last date of work for the foreclosing lien holder. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, overruling several of its past cases. The Supreme Court carefully analyzed the statute regarding the timing of the mechanic’s lien foreclosure action. The Court found that the statute requires that a lien holder commence its mechanic’s lien foreclosure action within one year of its last date of work and also requires that it name as a defendant to that action all recorded mechanic lien holders in the subject property. However, the statute does not prohibit adding to the action another party with an interest in the property, such as a mortgage holder, after the expiration of the one-year time period.
HOMEOWNER LOSES STATUTORY WARRANTY CLAIM IF IT FAILS TO PROVIDE ITS CONTRACTOR WITH THE OPPORTUNITY TO FIX THE CLAIMED DEFECTS. Roitenberg v. Halley’s Custom Homes, Inc. Minnesota Court of Appeals. Unpublished. Filed August 21, 2007. Plaintiff homeowner had substantial moisture-related damage to her home that she needed to have repaired so that she could sell it to a third party. Shortly after discovering the damage, the homeowner served the contractor with a complaint alleging breach of the statutory warranty against major construction defects. The contractor inspected the home, agreed that it needed repair, and sent a letter to the homeowner’s attorney stating that it needed more information so that it could determine the scope of repair and then make an appropriate proposal to perform those repairs. The homeowner’s attorney did not respond to that request and the homeowner went ahead with the repairs through another contractor. The district court granted the contractor’s motion for a directed verdict finding that the homeowner failed to present evidence of the essential element that the builder had either refused or was unable to repair the alleged defects. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals found that the statutory warranty for construction defects is a warranty for future performance and such a warranty cannot be breached unless the warrantor refuses to honor the warranty. This case was governed by the prior version of the statutory construction defect warranty, which did not expressly require the homeowner to allow the builder to inspect and repair the claimed defect. The warranty statute was amended in 2006, and requires that a homeowner “allow an inspection and opportunity to offer to repair.” However, the amended statute appears to allow the homeowner to reject the contractor’s offer to repair. It is not clear what effect such a rejection would have on the homeowner’s claim for breach of warranty. Based upon this case and the amended statute, I would assume that in order for a homeowner to prevail on a warranty claim after rejecting the contractor’s offer to repair, the homeowner would have to prove that the offer to repair was not sufficient to remedy the defects.
GOLF CART DRIVER OWES DUTY OF REASONABLE CARE TO PASSENGER. Haeg v. Geiger. Minnesota Court of Appeals. Unpublished. Filed September 4, 2007. Plaintiff and defendant were golfing together, with the defendant driving the plaintiff in a golf cart. While waiting their turn, the defendant parked the golf cart in front of a tee box. The plaintiff was then struck in the eye by a ball hit by another defendant. The defendant driver was granted summary judgment with the district court holding that he owed no duty to the plaintiff because there was no special relationship between them. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that a special relationship was not necessary for liability in this case. The Court of Appeals noted that Minnesota case law provides that operators of motor vehicles have a general duty to exercise reasonable care. The Court of Appeals determined that such principle applies with equal force to the operator of a golf cart. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals stated that the defendant driver had a duty, under Restatement Second of Torts § 321, to not place the plaintiff in harm’s way by parking the golf cart in front of the tee box.
Click here for
prior court summaries. If you have any questions, feel
free to contact any of our litigation attorneys: Scott Kelly or
William Partridge